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I. INTRODUCTION
In Gouging: Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes, and the Legal and Economic Aspects of 
Post-Disaster Price Regulation,1 Professor Geoffrey Rapp reviews anti-gouging 
laws and the economic objections to such regulations. He argues that de-
spite the fact that traditional economic arguments oppose anti-gouging laws, 
economic justiﬁ cations nevertheless exist for such post-disaster laws, includ-
ing the possible failure of electronic payment systems and behavioral insights 
about economic agents.2
This article ﬁ rst reviews Professor Rapp’s conclusion that economic argu-
ments offer a decidedly negative view of anti-gouging laws. It then analyzes and 
critiques Professor Rapp’s economic defense of such regulations by (1) apply-
ing a standard economic concept—elasticity—and highlighting the role of 
the market as a discovery process3 and (2) addressing behavioral economics’ 
assumptions about individuals’ responsiveness to price changes. Finally, this 
article offers recommendations concerning such laws.4
1. Geoffrey C. Rapp, Gouging: Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes, and the Legal and Economic Aspects 
of Post-Disaster Price Regulation, 94 Ky. L.J. 535 (2005).
2. Id. at 553–59.
3. See infra Parts II and III.
4. See infra Part IV.
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II. MASSIVE ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEM FAILURE
Economists often oppose anti-gouging laws, which limit price increases in 
the wake of a disaster.5 Prices perform the important role of signaling which 
resources are scarce and which are plentiful,6 and anti-gouging laws stiﬂ e this 
signal. For example, when gasoline becomes more scarce, its price rises, giv-
ing consumers and producers information about its scarcity. This information 
serves to allocate the limited resource to those consumers who desire it the 
most and are willing to pay the highest price for it. Oil reﬁ neries respond to 
such information by increasing gasoline production to take advantage of the 
higher price. Reﬁ neries will build up their supply as some consumers forgo 
purchasing gasoline and come up with alternate methods of transportation. 
The increased supply will ultimately lead to lower prices. Thus, relative price 
changes communicate the relative scarcity of resources to consumers and 
 producers.
When prices cannot communicate scarcity, consumers and producers lack 
the signals necessary to efﬁ ciently use resources.7 In the 1970s, for example, 
price controls held gasoline prices below market rates. As a result, consum-
ers did not reduce their usage, resulting in gas shortages.8 Anti-gouging laws 
are a type of price control; they prevent prices from changing to reﬂ ect real 
scarcity.
In his article, Professor Rapp outlines this basic economic argument against 
anti-gouging laws, and then argues for several exceptions under which anti-
gouging laws can lead to “hidden economic efﬁ ciency gains.”9 His ﬁ rst argu-
ment applies to situations of massive electronic payment system failure.
Professor Rapp argues that electronic payment processing systems are “ex-
tremely vulnerable” to short-term disruptions caused by “water damage to com-
puter and telecommunications infrastructure and power outages.”10 During 
such a short-term disruption, people who value a product highly may not have 
access to the currency or electronic assets necessary to complete transactions.11 
Allocative inefﬁ ciency, a condition in which people who desire a good the most 
are not the ones who receive it, worsens as goods are channeled to those who 
happen to have currency on hand, instead of those who have the greatest desire 
for the goods.12 For example, during a power outage, a person who has a strong 
 5. See Martha Musgrove, Editorial, Free Market? It’s Price-Gouging—and It Stinks! Miami 
Herald, Sept. 1, 1992, at 39A; see also Donald J. Boudreaux, On Price Gouging, The Freeman, 
Apr. 2005, at 14.
 6. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 519–30 (1945).
 7. See Ludwig von Mises, Human Action 698–710 (1996/1949).
 8. Hugh Rockoff, Price Controls, in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics II-43 (David R. 
Henderson ed., 2008).
 9. Rapp, supra note 1, at 553 (stating that his contribution to the economic perspective iden-
tiﬁ es efﬁ ciencies from anti-gouging laws that other economists have yet to identify).
10. Id. at 554.
11. Id. at 554–55.
12. Id.
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desire for ice in order to store penicillin may not have the currency needed to 
buy it. Instead, another individual who does have the currency will purchase 
the ice to keep his soda chilled. If both people had access to currency, then 
the ﬁ rst person would have been willing to pay more for the ice. However, the 
shortage of currency meant that the second person received the ice, so alloca-
tive inefﬁ ciency occurs.
Negative externalities arise when an uninvolved party is adversely affected 
by someone’s actions. Professor Rapp argues that negative externalities arise 
from underconsumption of toiletries and disinfectants due to a shortage of 
currency caused by massive payment system failure.13 This underconsump-
tion spreads disease.14 When “[c]onsumers who forego [sic] gasoline and the 
vehicular mobility it facilitates . . . remain in crowded, unstable environments, 
[it leads] to violent tinderboxes.”15 In these cases, the underconsumption of 
certain goods has negative effects on people who are not involved in the con-
sumption choices made.
Professor Rapp asserts further that “consumers may be operating under im-
perfect information (or irrationality) in post-disaster settings” that will prevent 
markets from working efﬁ ciently.16 “By creating disincentives for prompt price 
inﬂ ation,” he argues, anti-gouging laws “may give consumers time to make in-
telligent choices and to obtain products with their limited hard currency assets 
before those currency reserves run out.”17 By keeping prices low, he argues, 
uninformed and irrational people will not spend all of their currency.18
Professor Rapp’s arguments are subject to several criticisms. First, and 
most importantly, if the goal is to ensure that those who most desire goods are 
the ones who receive them, then price gouging by sellers is actually desirable. 
The reason for this is somewhat unintuitive but relies on a standard economic 
concept: elasticity.19
Elasticity is a measure of how responsive a person is to a change in a good’s 
price. Elasticity of demand measures the percentage change in the quantity of 
a good demanded in response to a percentage change in that good’s price. If 
the percentage change in the quantity demanded is greater than the percent-
age change in price, then the demand is elastic. If the percentage change in 
the quantity demanded is less than the percentage change in price, then the 
demand is inelastic. In short, inelastic demand means that consumers are rela-
tively unresponsive to price changes; elastic demand means that consumers are 
more responsive to price changes.
13. Id. at 555.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Walter Nicholson, Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions 499 
(South-Western Thomson Learning 8th ed. 2002).
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A relationship exists between an individual’s elasticity of demand for a 
good and his total expenditure on that good. Total expenditure on a good is 
the number of units purchased multiplied by the per-unit price. One’s elas-
ticity of demand affects total expenditure because it measures the change 
in the number of units demanded based on a change in price. When an 
individual has elastic demand, a rise in price will lead to a greater than pro-
portional fall in the quantity of units demanded (i.e., the percentage change 
in price is less than the percentage change in quantity). As a result, total ex-
penditure will fall. On the other hand, if an individual has inelastic demand, 
the quantity of units demanded will fall less proportionally than a price rise 
(i.e., the percentage change in price is greater than the percentage change 
in quantity). Total expenditure will rise. In sum, an individual’s demand elas-
ticity will determine whether a change in price causes total expenditure to 
increase or decrease.
An individual’s elasticity of demand depends on the price of the good. At 
low prices, a person will have inelastic (relatively unresponsive) demand for 
that good, whereas at high prices, a person will have elastic (relatively re-
sponsive) demand. If price was set at a level where the consumer had inelastic 
demand, total expenditure would increase when the price increases because 
the quantity demanded would fall less than proportionally to the price rises. 
A proﬁ t-maximizing seller could, therefore, increase revenue by increasing 
the price. Sellers will continue to raise the price until it is set in the elastic 
portion of the demand curve. Thus, sellers will never set a price at a level 
where an individual has inelastic demand.
How does this affect allocative efﬁ ciency? Professor Rapp argues that anti-
gouging laws will keep prices low, which will keep total expenditure low and, 
thus, limit the extent of allocative inefﬁ ciency. Since businesses will never set 
prices in the inelastic range of the demand curve, the quantity demanded will 
fall more than proportionally to a price rise. As a result, total expenditure will 
decrease when price rises.20 An anti-gouging law, however, will keep prices 
low and increase total expenditure relative to a price rise.21 Anti-gouging laws 
20. Under speciﬁ c conditions, such as linear demand and zero marginal costs, price can po-
tentially be on the unit elastic point of the demand curve, which means that there would be a 
proportional change in quantity from a change in price. In such a case, total expenditure will not 
change from a rise in price. Realistically, however, marginal costs are not zero, meaning that price 
is set in the elastic part of the demand curve.
21. Mathematically, this conclusion can be proved by examining how total expenditure changes 
after a change in price (P) and quantity (Q):
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lead to the use of more currency by those who have it, which, according to 
Professor Rapp, leads to greater allocative inefﬁ ciency than if the price had 
risen. Because higher prices reduce allocative inefﬁ ciency, Professor Rapp 
should be in favor of laws that prohibit keeping prices low.
Even if a shortage of readily accessible hard currency occurs, the additional 
constraint of price controls can only worsen allocative efﬁ ciency. Prices are 
an allocation mechanism. Preventing prices from allocating resources makes 
the market less efﬁ cient, even among liquidity-constrained consumers. That 
is, even if some people have limited access to currency, inefﬁ ciency will never-
theless occur through the prevention of price allocation among those people 
having the requisite currency. Thus, the ability for higher prices to reduce 
allocative inefﬁ ciency among liquidity-constrained consumers undermines a 
primary beneﬁ t Professor Rapp attributes to anti-gouging laws.
Professor Rapp also makes several other arguments supporting the use 
of anti-gouging laws. The remainder of this section examines these reasons.
The negative externalities that Professor Rapp mentions—those stemming 
from the underconsumption of toiletries, disinfectants, and gasoline—arise 
from a shortage of goods, not from a shortage of currency. Even if one accepts 
his conclusion that a shortage of currency results in allocative inefﬁ ciency, this 
does not imply that those who purchased disinfectants and toiletries are using 
them ineffectively. Rather, the root of the problem is simply that not enough 
disinfectants and toiletries are available. Sellers have an incentive to supply 
greater quantities when the price rises, but anti-gouging laws prevent this.
Finally, Professor Rapp argues that market efﬁ ciency will diminish when 
consumers are “operating under imperfect information (or irrationality) in 
post-disaster settings.”22 Economic theory, however, shows that perfect infor-
mation is only one of the sufﬁ cient conditions for market equilibrium; it is not 
a necessary condition.23 Economists also have shown empirically that people 
with imperfect information can achieve market efﬁ ciency.24 Indeed, imperfect 
information is normal. To argue that markets only work with perfect infor-
mation is to argue that markets never work. More fundamentally, Professor 
Rapp’s argument that lower prices will allow uninformed consumers to main-
tain cash balances is incorrect. As shown above, anti-gouging laws will cause 
total expenditure to increase relative to a rise in price.
Price elasticity of demand, by deﬁ nition, is inelastic when eQ, P > –1 and elastic when eQ, P < –1. Q 
is always positive when goods are sold, so the sign of ∂PQ/∂P, which is dependent on eQ, P , will 
determine whether total expenditure increases or decreases. Because a proﬁ t-maximizing ﬁ rm 
will never set price in an inelastic portion of the demand curve, price and total expenditure will 
move in opposite directions.
22. Rapp, supra note 1, at 555.
23. Vernon L. Smith, Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms 
61–62 (2008).
24. See Vernon L. Smith, Markets as Economizers of Information: Experimental Examination of 
the “Hayek Hypothesis,” 20 Econ. Inquiry 165, 177 (1982); see also Dhananjay K. Gode & Shyam 
Sunder, Allocative Efﬁ ciency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute 
for Individual Rationality, 101 J. Pol. Econ. 119, 134–35 (1993).
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Professor Rapp makes four recommendations based on his analysis: anti-
gouging laws should (1) be geographically constrained to the disaster area, 
(2) only apply where destruction is widespread, (3) have strict time limits, and 
(4) not apply to all producers but instead focus on suppliers of goods that are 
most likely to be in high demand and that alleviate negative externalities.25
I agree with Professor Rapp’s recommendations to the extent that they re-
duce the application of existing anti-gouging laws. Given Professor Rapp’s goal 
of limiting allocative inefﬁ ciency, however, the extent to which anti- gouging 
laws still apply will, by keeping prices low, lead to precisely the opposite of 
his desired result. Furthermore, if people think that the price of a good will 
rise in the future, then the price for that good today is relatively cheaper, and 
people will demand more of it. By advocating a time limit on activation, these 
laws will increase the current demand for goods, which Professor Rapp argues 
will be inefﬁ cient due to the shortage of currency. While negative externali-
ties and increased transaction costs are unfortunate, given that they exist,26 an 
anti-gouging law will exacerbate rather than alleviate difﬁ culties.
III. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND PRODUCT 
MARKET INEFFICIENCY
Professor Rapp’s second justiﬁ cation for anti-gouging laws employs argu-
ments about economists’ behavioral assumptions about people.27 Traditional 
economic models assume that people’s choices will respond to changes in 
relative prices and that these responses will take place in a timely fashion. 
Behavioral economics, on the other hand, relaxes assumptions about indi-
viduals’ responsiveness to price changes. Using two concepts from the latter 
approach, Professor Rapp argues that sellers’ use of the “availability” and “an-
choring” heuristics makes prices unresponsive to changing conditions.28 As a 
result, markets can become more efﬁ cient when anti-gouging laws force sellers 
to keep prices low.29
A. Availability Heuristic
The availability heuristic, Professor Rapp argues, occurs when people are 
led “to seemingly irrational behavior because [they] overestimate the prob-
ability of an event if they have witnessed that event.”30 The result, according 
to Professor Rapp, is the following:
In post-disaster markets, the availability heuristic may lead to higher price hikes 
than supply shocks and increased demand would require. Suppliers in affected 
areas—having witnessed the destructive force of a natural disaster or terrorist attack 
25. Rapp, supra note 1, at 555–57.
26. I respectfully question empirically how often massive payment system failure occurs com-
pared to the total number of events for which anti-gouging laws apply.
27. Rapp, supra note 1, at 557–59.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 557–58.
30. Id. at 557.
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and experienced ﬁ rst hand the difﬁ culty of conducting “business as usual”—may 
overestimate the market impact of the relevant event. Fearing widespread supply 
outages and future difﬁ culties, suppliers may increase prices beyond the market 
equilibrium.31
Under this theory, anti-gouging laws would then play a role in preventing 
sellers’ overestimation of price increases.
Professor Rapp is correct to question the rationality of people in the wake 
of natural disasters. Obviously these traumatic events are likely to disturb 
“business as usual.” However, Professor Rapp’s analysis mischaracterizes the 
market as a static environment. Especially in times of crisis, the market is a 
dynamic process of discovery. The equilibrium price arises only after a trial-
and-error process through the feedback mechanism of the market. The nature 
of the market means that society cannot know the outcome without allowing 
the process to actually play itself out.32
The ﬁ nal, optimal price is unknown to all participants before actually en-
gaging in market exchanges. One role of prices is to disseminate information 
to market participants. Another equally important aspect is that ﬂ exible prices 
allow entrepreneurs to discover new information. Higher prices communicate 
a need, but they also spur entrepreneurial efforts to ﬁ nd new and better ways 
to satisfy those needs. By removing the possibility of overestimation, anti-
gouging laws simultaneously remove the forces that disseminate information, 
encourage innovation, and eventually drive prices to the equilibrium level.
Even if we knew what the future equilibrium price would be, a below-
equilibrium price may be more inefﬁ cient than an above-equilibrium price 
in the present. Professor Rapp argues that an inefﬁ ciently low price is pref-
erable because “as supply expands and demand retracts in the weeks after a 
disaster, that pricing level may be the more optimal level over a medium-run 
view than what a sticky market would have yielded.”33 Shifts in supply and 
demand, however, do not occur spontaneously. Demand will retract when 
people satisfy their need for disaster-related goods, and supply will shift when 
new sellers enter the market. By keeping prices below the equilibrium level, 
anti-gouging laws promote buying and lead to shortages, which in turn pre-
vent satisfaction of disaster-related wants. Prices set below equilibrium also 
diminish incentives for new sellers to enter the market. When the feedback 
mechanism of market prices is disabled, these supply and demand shifts are 
less likely to occur, which delays recovery.
B. Anchoring Heuristic
Professor Rapp’s ﬁ nal justiﬁ cation for anti-gouging laws is the use of “an-
choring” heuristics by sellers. He deﬁ nes anchoring as “the process by which 
31. Id. at 557–58.
32. Israel M. Kirzner, The Perils of Regulation: A Market-Process Approach, in Discovery and 
the Capitalist Process 119, 131 (1985); see also F.A. Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, 
in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas (1978).
33. Rapp, supra note 1, at 558.
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an individual attaches a particular value to an item because the value is ‘avail-
able’ or ‘strongly present in the mind.’ ”34 Due to this, he argues, even after 
sellers realize that they have overreacted (due to availability bias), they will 
not lower prices. Furthermore, because all sellers are subject to these biases, 
the market price will remain inefﬁ ciently high.35 Professor Rapp rejects the 
argument that sellers will identify this proﬁ t opportunity and lower prices.36
A fundamental weakness underlying Professor Rapp’s argument is that po-
tential sellers from other geographic locations are not subject to the avail-
ability and anchoring biases, at least not to the same extent. Anti-gouging 
laws will deter these sellers from making proﬁ ts by bringing in supplies from 
unaffected areas. For example, after Hurricane Ivan ravaged Florida in 2004, 
John Charles Mikell and John Tate Mikell drove more than 300 miles to sell 
much-needed gas generators in disaster areas.37 Upon arrival, however, inves-
tigators from the attorney general’s ofﬁ ce stopped them.38 They were charged 
with violating Florida’s anti-gouging law.39 If availability and anchoring bi-
ases are present, we especially want entrepreneurial endeavors like these to be 
 encouraged, not outlawed.
These behavioral assumptions lead Professor Rapp to reafﬁ rm his previ-
ous recommendations, with one exception. He argues that the availability and 
anchoring heuristics will affect sellers more strongly near the disaster area and 
gradually decline the further away the sellers are located.40 Thus, anti-gouging 
laws should be more vigorously enforced the closer one gets to the affected 
area.41 However, if behavioral heuristics bias sellers’ actions signiﬁ cantly, then 
clear proﬁ t and loss signals will help overcome the use of inefﬁ cient heuristics. 
Allowing prices to rise in the areas closest to a disaster is especially important 
in this scenario. Price increases will signal to other sellers where goods are most 
urgently needed and create the competitive pressures necessary to overcome 
behavioral biases.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Many states’ primary purpose in enacting price-gouging legislation is to 
prohibit sellers from taking “unfair” advantage of consumers.42 Anti-gouging 
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Press Release, Ofﬁ ce of the Attorney Gen. of Fla., Attorney General Charges Three More 
Businesses with Price Gouging (Sept. 29, 2004), available at http://myﬂ oridalegal.com/__8525
62220065EE67.nsf/0/D2FEB2EE9801D69B85256F1E0064B9AE?Open&Highlight=0,
mikell (noting that the Mikells live hundreds of miles away from the disaster area) (on ﬁ le with 
the Public Contract Law Journal ).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Rapp, supra note 1, at 559.
41. Id.
42. See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-301 (West 2007) (“The General Assembly hereby ﬁ nds that 
during emergencies and major disasters . . . some merchants have taken unfair advantage of 
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laws require broad scope and liberal interpretation to cover various contin-
gencies in the face of the unpredictable and unexpected nature of disasters.43 
In an effort to cover the many important goods and different regions that 
could be affected, states tend to construct laws that are overly inclusive.44
I propose a different interpretation of which actions constitute taking “un-
fair” advantage of consumers. Two types of “unfair” treatment are associated 
with natural disasters. First, higher prices as a result of the arbitrary occur-
rence of a natural disaster in a particular locale can be seen as “unfair” where 
citizens elsewhere are not subject to price increases. Second, a seller who uses 
heightened fear about supply scarcity because of a recent disaster to engage 
in fraudulent activities, make misrepresentations, or otherwise take advantage 
of consumers results in “unfair” treatment. Higher prices arise under the ﬁ rst 
scenario because of changes in real factors and, as argued above, lead to ben-
eﬁ cial consequences. Higher prices associated with the latter scenario, how-
ever, necessitate judicial or legislative intervention.
Professor Rapp states that common law doctrines such as unconscionabil-
ity and the duty of good faith and fair dealing will probably not be effective in 
restraining post-disaster price increases.45 However, he makes this conclusion 
in reference to the laws’ ability to restrict the price increases caused by the 
“arbitrary unfairness” of a natural disaster’s occurrence.
Professor Rapp is correct that the doctrine of unconscionability and the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing will not keep price low, but they will deter 
sellers from using fraud or misrepresentation to take unfair advantage of con-
sumers, yet still allow prices to rise in response to the very real, albeit “unfair” 
conditions the disaster has caused and, in doing so, communicate information 
and create socially beneﬁ cial incentives.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Professor Rapp’s article is an excellent survey of anti-gouging laws and the 
economic case against them. However, his own economic justiﬁ cations for 
anti-gouging laws are not compelling. Anti-gouging laws exacerbate alloca-
tive inefﬁ ciency and, if biased behavioral heuristics are signiﬁ cant, prevent 
prices from motivating sellers to increase supply. They prevent market prices 
from communicating scarcities and aligning incentives. When evading these 
laws, buyers and sellers often waste resources by conducting exchanges in 
consumers by greatly increasing prices . . .”); see also Cal. Penal Code § 396 (West 2007); N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 56:8-107 (West 2007); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 396-r (McKinney 2007); 73 Pa. Stat. 
Ann. § 232.2 (West 2007); W. Va. Code Ann. § 46A-6J-1 (West 2007).
43. See Cal. Penal Code § 396 (“[I]t is the intent of the Legislature that this section be 
liberally construed so that its beneﬁ cial purposes may be served.”); see also Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 47-18-5101 (West 2007); W. Va. Code Ann. § 46A-6J-1.
44. For example, many states have laws that restrict prices on all goods, including those that 
are unrelated to the disaster.
45. Rapp, supra note 1, at 541.
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inefﬁ cient ways,46 such as waiting in lines, conducting black-market transac-
tions, and purchasing from less-efﬁ cient sellers.47
Natural disasters destroy wealth; there is no reason for anti-gouging laws 
to compound this. Accordingly, judicial and legislative intervention should 
focus speciﬁ cally on deterring activities of fraud and misrepresentation, rather 
than on price increases in general.
46. Id. at 551.
47. After Hurricane Wilma in 2005, “instant entrepreneurs” in Little Haiti ﬂ outed anti-
 gouging laws and sold gasoline on the side of the street in empty buckets, milk bottles, and even 
pickle jars. Abhi Raghunathan, South Florida Shortages Fuel Black Market, St. Petersburg Times, 
Oct. 29, 2005, at 4B.
